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9.1  Introduction 
The inflation performance of economies is interesting to academic econo- 
mists, policymakers, politicians, and the electorate. Economists are in broad 
agreement about how policy actions affect inflation rates, and they share much 
common ground about the factors that policy should consider in choosing an 
economy’s inflation rate. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the relative consensus about what determines 
inflation and about how inflation rates should be set, inflation differs substan- 
tially across countries. Figure 9.1 graphs the inflation rate by  country for the 
1973-94  period. The highest average inflation rate in the sample is 127% (Bra- 
zil) and the lowest is 2%  (Central African Republic). Even  excluding what 
might be considered special cases, inflation rates differ markedly. If these dif- 
ferences reflect differences in the factors that determine desired inflation, given 
the constraints each economy faces, then the differences provide support both 
for economic models of inflation and for the notion that policymakers choose 
inflation in a reasonably intelligent fashion. If the differences in inflation can- 
not be  at least approximately attributed to factors that should explain these 
differences, then either economists’ models or policymakers’ actions, or both, 
are lacking. 
This paper  attempts to  explain the  differences in  inflation  performance 
across countries. Some earlier research has examined this topic, but it has con- 
sidered only a few of the factors that might be empirically important determi- 
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Fig. 9.1  Average annual inflation rates, 1973-94,  110 countries 
nants of inflation rates. In particular, existing research has focused on institu- 
tional characteristics like central bank independence (Grilli, Masciandaro, and 
Tabellini 1991; Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992), on the degree of open- 
ness (Romer 1993; Lane 1995), and on financial-sector opposition to inflation 
(Posen  1993, 1995). These factors are potentially important determinants of 
inflation, and existing evidence supports a role for each. Nevertheless, a priori 
reasoning suggests a number of additional factors that should matter as well. 
We analyze the degree to which prior inflation experience, optimal tax con- 
siderations, and time-consistency issues other than central bank independence. 
as well as the factors considered in the existing literature, are important deter- 
minants of  inflation rates across countries. The basic approach, as in earlier 
papers, is cross-country regressions of average inflation rates on country char- 
acteristics. The innovation of this paper is simply to include a broader range 
of country characteristics on the right-hand side. 
The paper provides several interesting conclusions relative to the existing 
literature. First, institutional arrangements play almost no role in determining 
inflation outcomes, once other factors are held constant. Thus, central bank 
independence and the nature of exchange rate arrangements are not empirically 
important  determinants  of  inflation  rates.  Second,  time-consistency  issues 
other than central bank independence play a more significant role in determin- 
ing inflation rates: openness, political  stability, and proxies  for government 
policy distortions are all related to inflation in the direction suggested by time- 
consistency considerations, usually in a robust manner. Third, optimal tax con- 
siderations  are an  important determinant of  differences  in  inflation perfor- 
mance: countries with greater expenditure needs make greater use of the infla- 
tion tax, and countries that face greater difficulty in  collecting  noninflation 
taxes make heavier use of the inflation tax. Fourth, financial-sector opposition 
to inflation does not explain much of the cross-country variation in inflation. 337  Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries? 
Finally, prior inflation experience-possibly  through its effect on the taste for 
inflation, possibly because it proxies unmeasured but persistent determinants 
of current inflation-plays  a nonnegligible role in determining inflation perfor- 
mance. All of  these conclusions are subject to significant caveats, which we 
discuss in section 9.4. 
9.2  Review of the Literature and Discussion of Additional Issues 
This section summarizes briefly the earlier empirical work on the determi- 
nants of average inflation rates and then discusses the additional factors that 
we consider in our analysis. 
9.2.1  Review of the Literature 
The  framework that  has  guided the  literature to  date consists of  time- 
consistency models of inflation, especially Kydland and Prescott (1977) and 
Barro and Gordon (1983). In these models, the absence of  credible commit- 
ment devices means central banks choose higher than optimal inflation rates, 
even though they share the private sector’s preferences for inflation relative to 
output. This class of  models suggests that institutional features of  a central 
bank, as well as other political and institutional features of an economy, might 
have  important effects on  inflation  outcomes. For example, central banks 
whose governors are appointed for long terms might be better insulated from 
political pressures to inflate, implying a relatively low inflation rate. More gen- 
erally, this line of reasoning suggests that low inflation should be associated 
with the degree to which central banks are insulated from political pressure, a 
condition usually referred to as central bank independence (CBI). 
A number of  authors examine the relation between average inflation and 
proxies for CBI. Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), for example, con- 
struct one indicator of political independence and another of economic inde- 
pendence for a sample of high-income countries. They regress cross-country 
differences in inflation rates on both indicators and a dummy variable for par- 
ticipation in the European Monetary System (EMS). The indicators of  CBI 
always have the expected negative sign, while the estimated coefficient of the 
EMS dummy is not significantly different from zero. Alesina and Summers 
(1993) report a similar result using closely related indices and samples. Cu- 
kierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), using a more sophisticated index of inde- 
pendence, also document a negative relation between inflation and CBI for 
high-income countries, but they show that the relation has the wrong sign for 
middle- and low-income countries. 
The failure of CBI to correlate negatively with inflation in developing coun- 
tries is just one problem with this literature. A second is that the relation be- 
tween CBI and inflation is not necessarily causal, a point emphasized by Posen 
(1993, 1995). He argues that CBI is not universally desired because of  the 
distributive consequences of alternative monetary policies. Given these conse- 338  Marta Campillo and Jeffrey A. Miron 
quences, CBI is unlikely to be self-enforcing, so the preferences for price sta- 
bility embodied by CBI require political support. If CBI does not embody such 
preferences, it will not affect inflation, and if  such preferences were already 
supported, independence is unnecessary 
Posen argues that a major source of political opposition to inflation derives 
from the financial sector. Moreover, national differences in both the financial 
sector’s distaste for inflation and its ability to express that distaste are likely to 
play a major role in determining both inflation and CBI. Posen creates a vari- 
able called financial opposition to inflation (FOI) that is designed to measure 
these two effects. The index is a significant predictor of CBI and also of aver- 
age inflation rates. Moreover, CBI does not predict averages rates of inflation 
once Posen controls for FOI. The commonly presumed ability of CBI to lower 
inflation, independent of the central bank’s political context, is not supported 
by his analysis. 
Posen’s results apply both to the countries in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation  and Development  (OECD) and to a broader  sample consisting 
of  low-to-moderate-inflation countries.  Posen  suggests that the  relationship 
should not hold for high or hyperinflation countries, since the financial sectors 
of  such countries have long since given up opposing inflation. To  survive in 
hyperinflations, banking and other financial firms adapt to their monetary envi- 
ronment, and once adapted they have much less incentive to oppose inflation. 
With its main protector absent, an independent central bank cannot pursue a 
sustained counter-inflationary policy, so CBI will not affect inflation  in this 
case. According to this  view,  the pattern of which countries’ inflation levels 
correlate negatively with CBI is explained by the incentives facing the finan- 
cial sector. 
Another issue that arises in interpreting the results of the CBI literature is 
whether other aspects of a country’s political structure are important determi- 
nants of  its ability to precommit. Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992) 
note that,  controlling for the  stage of development and  the  structure of  the 
economy, more unstable and polarized countries are likely to collect a larger 
fraction of their revenues from the inflation tax, at least partially because such 
countries are likely to have difficulty in maintaining a time-consistent policy. 
They provide evidence, based on various measures of political stability, that 
inflation is higher and CBI lower the greater is the degree of political instability.’ 
The literature summarized  so far examines  the  political and institutional 
constraints on the central bank’s ability to choose low inflation. A different line 
of work examines the central bank’s incentive to choose low inflation, political 
and institutional constraints held constant. Romer (1993) argues that unantici- 
1. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) also provide evidence that political factors play an important 
role in determining inflation outcomes. The primary focus of their paper, however, is not inflation 
but the effects and determinants of capital controls. Moreover, their cmpirical specification differs 
substantially from the one we consider below, so we do not examine further the particular issues 
addressed in their paper. 339  Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries? 
pated monetary expansion causes real exchange rate depreciation, and since 
the harms of real depreciation are greater in more open economies, the benefits 
of surprise inflation are a decreasing function of  the degree of openness. This 
implies that, in the absence of binding precommitment, monetary authorities 
in more open economies will on average expand less, and the result will be 
lower average rates of inflation. 
The empirical evidence indicates that average rates of inflation are signifi- 
cantly lower in more open economies. These results are stronger in countries 
that are less politically stable and have less independent central banks. This is 
consistent with the idea that the openness-inflation relationship arises from the 
dynamic inconsistency of  discretionary policy, since one would expect such 
countries to have had less success in overcoming the dynamic inconsistency 
problem. The link between openness and inflation holds across virtually all 
types of countries with the exception of the most highly developed countries. 
In this small group of countries, average inflation rates are low and essentially 
unrelated to openness. Again the results are consistent with the view that these 
countries have largely overcome the dynamic inconsistency of optimal mone- 
tary policy. 
Lane (1995) argues that Romer’s explanation of  the influence of openness 
on inflation is a limited one, because it applies only to countries large enough 
to affect the structure of  international relative prices. He claims the openness- 
inflation relation is rather due to imperfect competition and nominal price ri- 
gidity in the nontraded sector. The idea is that a surprise monetary expansion, 
given predetermined prices in the nontraded  sector, increases production  of 
nontradables. This expansion is socially beneficial because of  the inefficient 
monopolistic underproduction  in the nontraded sector in the equilibrium be- 
fore the shock. The more open an economy, the smaller is the share of nontrad- 
ables in consumption and the less important the correction of the distortion in 
that sector. Assuming the existence of  a government that cares about social 
welfare, this generates an inverse relationship between openness and the incen- 
tive to unleash a surprise inflation, even for a country too small to affect its 
terms of trade. 
Lane shows that the inverse relationship between openness and inflation is 
strengthened when country size is held constant; that is, independent of  the 
size of the country, openness negatively impacts inflation, consistent with the 
small-country explanation of the relationship advanced in his paper. The result 
is robust  to the inclusion of  additional  control variables  such as per capita 
income,  measures of  CBI, and political  stability. Moreover, controlling for 
country size makes the result strong and robust in the high-income countries, 
the one sample in which Romer did not find a strong result. 
Overall, therefore, the existing literature suggests that CBI is associated with 
lower inflation in  rich countries, that this relation derives significantly from 
political constraints flowing from the financial sector, and that openness is neg- 
atively associated with inflation, possibly through a number of mechanisms. 340  Marta Campillo and Jeffrey A. Miron 
9.2.2  Additional Factors to Consider 
Our analysis considers three main issues in addition to those addressed in 
the existing literature. 
The first is whether differences in inflation across countries reflect differ- 
ences in the distaste for inflation. Such differences might arise for a number of 
reasons. Countries that experienced high inflation in the past might be more 
aware of the negative consequences of  high inflation and therefore be more 
opposed to repeated episodes; this explanation is frequently offered to explain 
Germany’s low inflation rate. Similarly, countries that experienced variable in- 
flation in the past might be relatively inflation averse, either because the elec- 
torate does not readily distinguish between means and variances or because 
high inflation is indeed more likely to be variable (Ball and Cecchetti 1990). 
Inflation aversion might also differ across countries at a given point in time 
because of existing institutional and legal structures. For example, a country 
with an indexed tax system might be less opposed to inflation, other things 
equal, than one without  such indexation. Other factors along these lines in- 
clude the degree of wage indexation and the prevalence of long-term contracts. 
Each of the factors is endogenous with respect to inflation over a sufficiently 
long period of  time, but since these arrangements take time to change, they 
might be regarded as approximately predetermined at any point in time. 
Still another factor that might determine a given country’s aversion to infla- 
tion is its industrial structure. In particular, the financial sectors of economies 
have traditionally been active opponents of inflation (Posen 1995), so countries 
with relatively large and politically influential financial sectors might tend to 
experience low inflation. 
A second set of issues we introduce consists of optimal tax considerations. 
A considerable literature examines whether the behavior of inflation over time, 
and especially its relation to other taxes, is consistent with the principles of 
optimal taxation  (e.g., Mankiw  1987; Poterba  and Rotemberg  1990; Grilli, 
Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991). With the exception of Mankiw’s results for 
the United States, this exercise has generated relatively little support for the 
hypothesis that inflation rates change from year to year because the optimal 
inflation tax changes from year to year. 
The analysis here considers a cruder question, which is whether differences 
in average inflation rates across countries are consistent with optimal tax con- 
siderations. On the one hand, optimal tax considerations suggest that countries 
with higher expenditures (relative to output) should have higher levels of  all 
taxes, including the inflation rate. On the other hand, these considerations im- 
ply that, holding expenditures constant, inflation should be higher in countries 
where the demand for money is relatively inelastic. Differences in this elastic- 
ity might occur because of differences in the sophistication of the banking 
system, since highly developed banking systems provide good substitutes for 
money and therefore more elastic money demand. Alternatively, differences 341  Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries? 
might occur because of  differences in the size of the underground economy, 
since illegal activity will tend to be conducted with currency rather than with 
demand deposits or other substitutes. 
The third new issue we address concerns aspects of  the time-consistency 
problem other than CBI. Models like those of Barro and Gordon (1983) indi- 
cate that the incentive to create surprise inflation exists only if the rate of output 
targeted by a central bank differs from the rate of output consistent with nonac- 
celerating inflation (the “natural” rate). The central bank might target a rate 
higher than the natural rate if it believes the natural rate is below the social 
optimum. Thus, the rate of inflation should be increasing in the difference be- 
tween the natural rate of output and the socially optimal rate, and several ob- 
servable factors might produce such a difference. Unemployment insurance, 
minimum wage laws, and other labor market policies are likely to reduce the 
efficiency of  the labor market  and thereby lower the natural rate of output. 
Other sources of distortion include excessive levels of government purchases. 
9.3  Empirical Specification and Results 
We examine the determinants of country-level inflation rates as measured 
by the consumer price index (CPI) for the period 1973-94.* Our basic specifi- 
cation differs slightly from earlier papers, especially Romer (1993) and Lane 
(1995); they consider a shorter sample period (1973-89),  use the log rather 
than the level of inflation as the dependent variable, and measure inflation us- 
ing the GDP/GNP deflator. As demonstrated below, none of these differences 
makes a significant difference to the results. We employ the CPI because this 
measure of prices is available for the broadest sample of countries and for the 
longest sample periods. 
The basic sample we consider consists of the sixty-two countries for which 
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti provide their measure of CBI. We restrict the 
basic sample in this way for two reasons. First, the role of  CBI has been re- 
garded as central in much of the previous research on cross-country variation 
in inflation, so it seems important to include this variable in our initial exami- 
nations. Second, many of the other variables we consider are unavailable for a 
number of countries outside this list of sixty-two, so restricting the sample in 
this way sacrifices relatively few observations in any event. 
Figure 9.2 plots inflation for this sample of  sixty-two countries. Although 
we have dropped a number of observations in going from the longer to the 
shorter list of  countries, most of  the really high inflation countries remain. 
Thus, we have not inadvertently excluded all the interesting variation in the 
key variable. 
In addition to considering our basic sample, we examine a number of sub- 
samples. To determine whether our results derive mainly from the influence of 
2. Specifically, the dependent variable is (1/21) ln(CPI19&Y’I,9,3). 342  Marta Campillo and Jeffrey A. Miron 
Nicaragua 
Countries in  alphabetic order 
Fig. 9.2  Average annual inflation rates, 1973-94,  62 countries 
a few extreme observations, we consider samples that omit countries with aver- 
age inflation in excess of  100% per year or in excess of 50% per year. To deter- 
mine whether the results apply mainly to developed or less-developed econo- 
mies, we split the basic sample into the eighteen high-income countries versus 
all the remaining co~ntries.~ 
The estimation technique is ordinary least squares, with standard errors esti- 
mated by the White (1980) procedure. Data are from the International Finan- 
cial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, except as noted? 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 present summary statistics-means,  standard deviations, 
and cross correlations-for  the variable considered in the analysis be10w.~ 
9.3.1  Preliminaries 
We begin by reproducing the key results from the previous literature using 
our data set. Although these results are not new in any interesting sense, they 
allow us to conclude that the new  variables we introduce, rather than some 
difference in specification, are responsible for any differences in results. 
Table 9.3 reviews the results on CBI. Panel A displays the univariate regres- 
sion of  inflation on CWN’s measure of  CBL6  In  the eighteen high-income 
3. The eighteen high-income countries are the same as in  Romer  (I 993): Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Nether- 
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
4. When we calculate the mean of  a variable over a period of  time, we  do not always have 
observations for all the years in the specified period. In cases where the number of missing obser- 
vations is large, we drop the country from that regression. In cases where it is small, we calculate 
the mean based on the available subsample. 
5.  The results for the samples that exclude high-inflation countries are similar in most respects 
to those for the full sample. 
6. In our main regressions, we use the CWN index that is based only on the legal and institu- 
tional structure of the central bank and its operating procedures (Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 
1992, table 2, 362). We use this index, rather than one that partially reflects the performance of 
the economy, since we believe it is more plausibly taken as predetermined  relative to inflation 343  Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries? 
Table 9.1  Means and Standard Deviations 
High-Income  Less-Developed 
Whole Sample  Countries  Countries 
Standard  Standard  Standard 
Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation 
Average inflation, 1974-94 
Average inflation, 1948-72 
Central bank independence 
Political instability 
Imports/GDP, 1973-94 
Log income, 1980 
Log income per capita, 1980 
Exchange rate regime, 1974 
Debt/GDP (410).  1975 
Quality of the dataa 
17.07  23.25  7.19  5.12 
6.56  9.57  4.11  1.66 
0.34  0.12  0.37  0.16 
0.15  0.23  0.01  0.05 
33.05  20.95  33.99  19.14 
17.68  1.76  18.39  1.80 
8.16  1.08  9.13  0.12 
1.04  0.76  1.33  0.97 
27.87  24.20  20.73  13.66 
4.57  1.58  5.89  0.32 
22.80  27.66 
7.99  11.80 
0.33  0.09 
0.23  0.25 
32.50  22.23 
17.27  1.63 
7.60  0.98 
0.87  0.56 
32.03  27.97 
3.81  1.51 
5ummers and Heston 1988. 
countries, the relation is negative and robust, consistent with the predictions 
of standard time-consistency models. In the low-to-moderate-income sample, 
however, or in the entire sample for which CBI exists, the relation is positive, 
albeit insignificantly. This is not simply the influence of a few extreme coun- 
tries; exclusion of the very high inflation rate observations still leaves a posi- 
tive relation. 
Panel B adds Barro’s measure (1991) of political instability (the number of 
coups and revolutions) to the regression, while panel C adds the log of income 
per capita in  1980, and panel D adds both. In  some cases, these additional 
variables enter significantly, and we discuss their interpretation below. None of 
these modifications changes the basic story documented in panel A, however. 
Thus, our data set suggests that same basic conclusions about CBI documented 
earlier: the predicted negative relation holds in high-income countries but not 
generally. 
In table 9.4, we review the Romer (1993) and Lane (1995) results on open- 
ness. Panel A reproduces the basic result in Romer, which is that openness is 
negatively associated with inflation. The relation holds for the overall sample, 
for the less-developed  countries, and for the sample that excludes countries 
with high or very high inflation. The relation does not hold for the high-income 
countries, as noted in Romer. Panel B adds the log level of income in 1980, as 
suggested by Lane. This modification always leads to a larger absolute value of 
the coefficient and a smaller standard error; in particular, the relation becomes 
significant in the high-income countries (although the magnitude of  the effect 
is still relatively small). Panel C adds CBI, political instability, and per capita 
performance. We demonstrate in our robustness checks that this choice has little effect on the re- 
sults. Table 9.2  Correlation Matrices 
Whole Sample 
Inn494  Inf4872  CBI  Political Inst.  Imports  GDP  GDP/Capita  Exch. Rate  Debt  Q 
Average inflation, 1974-94 
Average inflation, 1948-72 
Central bank independence 
Political instability 
Imports/GDP, 1973-94 
Log income, 1980 
Log income per capita, 1980 
Exchange rate regime, 1974 
Debt/GDP (%), 1975 





















-0.11  1 
(-0.76) 
0.23  0.08 
(1.62)  (0.57) 
-0.20  0.07 
(-1.41)  (0.51) 
0.02  0.04 
(0.16)  (0.25) 
-0.20  0.14 
( -  1.42)  (0.96) 
0.03  -0.02 
(0.19)  (-0.15) 
-0.03  -0.08 
(-0.20)  (-0.59) 
-0.19  0.15 
(- 1.34)  (1.03) 
1 
-0.34 























0.34  1 
(2.52) 
-0.30  0.15  1 
-0.11  -0.03  -0.14  1 
(-2.14)  (1.05) 
(-0.79)  (-0.20)  (-0.98) 
0.01  1  0.39  0.81  0.19 
(2.93)  (9.47)  (1.30)  (0.09) High-Income Countries 
Average inflation, 1974-94 
Average inflation, 1948-72 
Central bank independence 
Political instability 
Imports/GDP, 1973-94 
Log income, 1980 
Log income per capita, 1980 
Exchange rate regime, 1974 
Debt/GDP (%),  1975 





















-0.27  1 
(- 1.13) 
-0.15  0.05 
(-0.60)  (0.20) 
-0.21  -0.09 
(-0.87)  (-0.36) 
-  0.44  0.12 
(- 1.94)  (0.50) 
-0.40  0.26 
(- 1.73)  (1.09) 
0.24  -0.03 
(0.97)  (-0.11) 
-0.14  -0.40 
(-0.48)  (-1.77) 
-0.34  -0.27 


























0.12  1 
(0.50) 
-0.63  -0.24  1 
(-3.23)  (-1.00) 
0.14  -0.30  -0.10  1 
(0.55)  (- 1.25)  (-0.42) 
0.43  -0.12  0.12  0.18  1 
(1.89)  (-0.47)  (0.50)  (0.73) 
(continued) Table 9.2  (continued) 
Less-Developed Countries 
Inf7494  Inf4872  CBI  Political Inst.  Imports  GDP  GDPKapita  Exch. Rate  Debt  Q 
Average inflation, 1974-94 
Average inflation, 1948-72 
Central bank independence 
Political instability 
Imports/GDP, 1973-94 
Log income, I980 
Log income per capita, 1980 
Exchange rate regime, 1974 
Debt/GDP (%),  1975 





















-0.10  1 
(-0.53) 
0.16  0.3  1 
(0.89)  (1.74) 
-0.22  0.22 
(-1.23)  (1.21) 
0.16  -0.18 
(0.86)  (-0.98) 
-0.09  0.02 
(-0.49)  (0.12) 
0.12  -0.16 
(0.65)  (-0.85) 
-0.08  0.11 
(-0.42)  (0.61) 
-0.08  0.15 


























0.24  1 
(1.31) 
-0.24  -0.09  1 
-0.  I1  0.20  -0.09  1 
(-1.30)  (-0.51) 
( -0.58)  (1.12)  (-0.48) 
0.29  0.67  -0.03  0.22  1 
(1  65)  (4.92)  (-0.16)  (1.21) 
Nore: /-statistics are in parentheses. 
“Summers  and Heston 1988. Table 9.3  Cross-sectional Regressions 
Dependent Variable = Average Inflation Rate, 1973-94 
Whole  High  Other 
Sample  Income  Countries  7~ 5 100  TI 5 50 
Panel A 
Constant  15.87  9.92  7.57  11.24  12.23 
(1.48)  (4.81)  (0.41)  (2.42)  (3.11) 
Central bank independence  18.88  -7.37  61.33  12.63  3.95 
(0.62)  (-2.24)  (1.16)  (0.85)  (0.36) 
R2  0.005  0.05  0.03  0.008  0.001 
N  62  18  44  58  56 
Constant  9.17 
Central bank independence  10.30 
Political instability  61.44 
R2  0.18 





































Constant  70.13 
Central bank independence  22.90 
(0.80) 
Log income per capita, 1980  -6.97 
(-2.21) 
R2  0.06 



































Constant  6.40 
(0.20) 
Central bank independence  9.96 
(0.37) 
Political instability  62.51 
(2.34) 
Log income per capita, 1980  0.33 
(0.09) 
RZ  0.18 
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Table 9.4  Cross-sectional  Regressions 
Dependent Variable = Average Inflation Rate, 1973-94 
Whole  High  Less 
Sample  Income  Developed  TI 5 100  5 50 
Panel A 
Constant  36.74  7.83  46.67  23.24  18.25 
(4.49)  (6.14)  (4.66)  (5.23)  (6.56) 
(-2.61)  (-0.87)  (-2.74)  (-2.58)  (-2.24) 
Imports/GDP, 1973-94  -0.43  -0.01  -0.55  -0.22  -0.13 
R2  0.07  0.004  0.10  0.07  0.05 
N  62  18  44  58  56 
Constant  137.80 
(3.21) 
(-3.71) 
( -  2.38) 
Imports/GDP, 1973-94  -0.66 
Log income, 1980  -5.35 
RZ  0.15 
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income to the specification; the results on openness remain robust. Thus, our 
data set also reproduces the basic results about openness. 
9.3.2  Basic New Results 
We  now turn to examining the additional issues raised in section 9.2. We 
first provide a base case regression and then consider robustness checks. 
The basic regression contains the following variables: CBI, political insta- 
bility, openness, the log level of  output, the log level of output per capita, an 349  Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries? 
exchange-rate-regime  dummy  (explained  below),  the  average inflation rate 
during the 1948-72  period, the level of government debt relative to output in 
1975, and the grade assigned by  Summers and Heston (1988) to the quality 
of their national accounts data for each country. Several comments about this 
specification are in order. 
The average inflation rate from the presample period is included as a pos- 
sible measure of the taste for inflation. According to one view, high past infla- 
tion implies lower current inflation because countries learn about the costs of 
inflation and then reform. This implies a negative coefficient. According to a 
different view, high past inflation leads the economy to invest in technologies 
for avoiding inflation’s negative effects, which subsequently reduces the costs 
of inflation. Under this interpretation, the coefficient should be positive. Alter- 
natively, past inflation might measure persistent aspects of the factors that de- 
termine inflation but are unmeasured or poorly measured in our regressions, 
which again implies a positive coefficient. 
We include political instability to proxy a number of possible effects. The 
most commonly discussed is that more instability makes it difficult for poli- 
cymakers to commit to low inflation. In addition, countries with political insta- 
bility  probably  tend to have larger amounts of underground  activity, which 
raises the optimal inflation rax. Similarly, countries with political instability 
tend to run inefficient economic programs, which suggests their natural and 
socially optimal rates of output or unemployment diverge. Nothing in our re- 
gressions allows us to sort out these effects, but in each case the expected sign 
on the coefficient is positive. 
We include debt relative to output in 1975 as a measure of the need for tax 
revenue.’ This variable will not capture all differences in expenditure paths, 
but the effect of a high initial level of debt on desired tax collections is unam- 
biguously positive, and this variable is less obviously endogenous with respect 
to inflation than other possible measures. We show below that other measures, 
such as expenditure relative to output, produce similar results. 
We include the log of income per capita in 1980 to capture several possible 
effects. A higher level of income per capita is likely to be accompanied by  a 
more sophisticated tax system and a more developed financial system, both of 
which imply lower optimal inflation tax and thus a negative coefficient. On the 
other hand, high-income countries might be better at innovating technologies 
for reducing the costs of  inflation, so their inflation aversion might be lower. 
This implies a positive coefficient. 
We include the Summers and Heston quality-of-data score to control for the 
level of the inflation tax relative to other taxes. For example, countries with 
large  informal  sectors, which  are typically  untaxed,  are also likely to have 
7. Since we measure inflation over the period  1973-94,  it might be preferable to use debt over 
output in 1973 or 1974. We could not construct this variable for a sufficient number of countries, 
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poor-quality  data. The Summers-Heston  score is higher  for countries with 
better-quality data, so the coefficient should be negative if the reasoning of- 
fered here is correct. This variable might also be correlated with factors that 
make the socially optimal rate of output or unemployment diverge from the 
natural rate; again, the expected coefficient is negative. 
We  include a dummy variable for the kind of  exchange rate regime, as in 
many previous papers, as a further check on the role on the time-consistency 
considerations. In particular, countries that have agreed to peg their currencies, 
especially when those agreements involve many countries, may face political 
costs of excessive inflation and therefore find it relatively easy to maintain a 
consistent policy. The variable we construct takes a value of  2 for countries 
that were in multilateral exchange rate systems in  1974, 1 for countries that 
were in unilateral exchange rate systems, and 0 for countries that allowed their 
currencies to float. Thus, a higher value of the variable implies, other things 
equal, a greater commitment to low inflation, so the coefficient should be nega- 
tive according to the time-consistency hypothesis. 
We  note that our measure of  the exchange rate regime is possibly a poor 
proxy for any effects of the exchange rate mechanism on inflation. By using 
data for 1974, we are failing to capture any effects that might have resulted 
from decisions about the exchange rate regime later in the sample. It is im- 
portant to avoid using a variable that measures the exchange rate regime during 
the middle of the sample, however, because such a variable is likely endoge- 
nous with respect to inflation. A country might maintain a pegged exchange 
rate over much or all of a particular sample period because it has solved the 
time-consistency problem, even if the decision to peg has no marginal effect 
on its ability to maintain low inflation. Even the variable we construct is prob- 
lematic, since countries with an underlying distaste for inflation might choose 
multilateral  exchange rate systems consistently, knowing they will have the 
discipline to live within the implied constraints. The beginning-of-sample mea- 
sure should be “less endogenous,” however, and we attempt to control for the 
differences in inflation aversion separately. 
This specification omits two key variables. First, we have no direct measure 
of the discrepancy between the natural rate of output and the socially optimal 
rate of  output. Political instability and quality of  the data might capture this 
effect to some degree, and we attempt more direct measurement below. These 
attempts are problematic, however, so we omit them from the basic specifica- 
tion. Second, we do not include FOI since it exists only for a narrow sample. 
Additional results below suggest this omission is not critical. 
Table 9.5 presents the main results. CBI enters with the wrong sign in all 
samples except the high-income sample, and even in this case the coefficient 
is nowhere near significant. Thus, CBI appears even less reliably related to 
inflation than indicated by the more parsimonious regressions in table 9.3. The 
dummy for the exchange rate regime enters with the wrong sign, although not 
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Table 9.5  Cross-sectional Regressions 
Dependent Variable = Average Inflation Rate, 1973-94 
Whole  High  Less 
Sample  Income  Developed  r  5 100  7~ 5 50 
Constant 
Average inflation, 1948-72 
Central bank independence 
Political instability 
Impons/GDP, 1973-94 
Log income, 1980 
Log income per capita, 1980 
Exchange rate regime, 1974 
Debt/GDP (%), 1975 
Quality of the data" 
R2 
N 
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Political instability enters positively, which is consistent with each of several 
possible mechanisms, but the result is not overwhelmingly consistent across 
samples. The magnitude of  the  estimated  effect, however, is large. A  one 
standard-deviation-higher level of political instability is associated with almost 
a 14.0%  higher rate of inflation in the full sample and with a more than 12.0% 
higher inflation rate in the low-to-moderate-income sample. The estimated ef- 
fect is essentially zero in the high-income sample, perhaps unsurprisingly. 
Past inflation experience is consistently positively associated with current 
inflation,  although  the  strength  of  the relation  is modest  outside the high- 
income countries. The estimated coefficient in the entire sample is about 0.6, 
which means  1 percentage-point higher value of prior inflation is associated 
with more than half a percentage point higher value of current inflation. The 
estimated effect is more than three times greater in the high-income sample. 
The relative  strength  and  magnitude of  this relation  in the high-income 
countries might simply indicate that we have failed to capture some determi- 
nant of inflation that is especially persistent in the high-income countries. A 352  Marta Campillo and Jeffrey A. Miron 
more interesting possibility is that high inflation induces investments in tech- 
nologies for avoiding the costs of inflation. Once these are developed, they are 
not costly to use, so they reduce future aversion to inflation. The creation or 
adoption of such technologies might be easier in high-income countries (e.g., 
they have better-developed financial markets), which would explain the com- 
parative strength of this effect in the high-income countries. The positive rela- 
tion documented certainly fails to indicate that countries with bad past inflation 
performances learn from their mistakes and therefore choose lower inflation in 
the future, other factors held constant. 
Openness and the level of  income enter both negatively  and significantly, 
although the magnitudes of  the estimated effects and their statistical signifi- 
cance fall relative  to the more parsimonious  regressions  in table 9.4. Thus, 
earlier results appear to have produced estimates of these effects on the high 
side, but the basic message is robust to controlling for a number of factors not 
considered in earlier papers. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated open- 
ness effect is still substantial. For the whole sample, the coefficient estimates 
indicate that a one-standard-deviation-lower import share is associated with an 
almost 8.0% higher inflation  rate.  In the high-income  sample the estimated 
effect is only about 1.5%, while in low-to-moderate-income  sample it is over 
12.0%. 
The two variables proxying  optimal tax  considerations  enter consistently 
with the correct sign and are quite robust: an initially high level of government 
debt is associated with  high future inflation,  and countries with  lousy data, 
which we interpret to be countries where collecting revenue via noninflation 
taxes is difficult, make relatively  greater reliance on the inflation tax. These 
results do not determine whether the inflation tax (and other taxes) are set at 
exactly the right level given past and future expenditures, nor whether the in- 
flation tax is set exactly right relative to other taxes; in this sense the tests being 
carried out are far weaker than in the optimal tax literature on the time path of 
inflation. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with the view that inflation is 
being used roughly as it should be from an optimal tax perspective. 
The magnitudes of these two effects are also substantial. A one-standard- 
deviation-higher level of  the debt-to-income  ratio is associated with  a more 
than 8.0% higher inflation rate in the full sample and with a more than  1.5% 
higher inflation  rate  in  the  high-income  sample. A  one-standard-deviation- 
higher data-quality score is associated with almost a 9.0% lower rate of infla- 
tion using the full sample estimates and with a more than 1.0% lower inflation 
rate using the high-income sample estimates. 
The final result is that, holding constant all the factors discussed, the level 
of income per capita is consistently positively related to inflation, usually in a 
robust manner. This outcome suggests the second of the two interpretations 
offered above, namely, that richer countries adapt to inflation more easily, so 
their distaste for inflation is lower. The magnitude of the relation is again large: 
a one-standard-deviation-higher level of income per capita is associated with 353  Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries? 
approximately a  14.0% higher inflation rate using the full-sample estimates 
and with an almost 2.0%  higher inflation rate using the high-income-sample 
estimates. 
To summarize, the results in table 9.5 suggest that institutional characteris- 
tics of  an economy, particularly CBI and exchange rate arrangements, are un- 
important determinants of inflation. Time-consistency issues play a substantial 
role through the openness mechanism, and possibly through political instabil- 
ity,  and  optimal tax  considerations are critical  as  well.  We  now  examine 
whether these conclusions stand up to more rigorous scrutiny. 
9.3.3  Robustness Checks 
As a first check on the robustness of the results presented above, it is useful 
to examine the simple correlations between the variables shown in table 9.2. 
The key fact is that the main results discussed above are present and reasonably 
robust just in the simple correlations. CBI is positively correlated with inflation 
in the full sample but negatively correlated in the high-income sample. The 
exchange rate variable is essentially uncorrelated with inflation in both sam- 
ples. In most other cases, the signs on the simple correlations are the same as 
in the multiple regression, and these correlations are often statistically signifi- 
cant.8 The main exception is income per capita. The simple correlation with 
inflation is negative, but the estimated regression coefficients are always posi- 
tive. The explanation appears to be that income per capita is positively corre- 
lated with a number of other variables, especially the quality-of-data variable. 
The next set of  checks considers other measures of  the taste for inflation. 
One possibility is that high inflation plays an important role in shaping the 
tastes for inflation only when past inflation is extreme in some manner. As one 
check on this possibility, we include the standard deviation of past inflation as 
an explanatory variable in addition to the mean of past inflation. In all cases, 
this variable enters negatively, with a t-statistic between 1.0 and  1.5, and the 
other coefficients are not strongly affected. Thus, this specification provides 
mild evidence that countries reform in response to past rni~takes.~ 
A third set of  checks concerns our measure of  the need for tax revenue. 
Instead of using the initial level of government debt relative to output, we in- 
clude the average level of  government expenditure relative to output over the 
1973-94  period. The results from this specification are consistent with those 
in table 9.5; expenditure over output always enters positively, although the sta- 
tistical significance is not overwhelming. When we include both expenditure 
over output and initial debt relative to output, debt enters positively and ro- 
bustly while expenditure tends to enter positively but not significantly. 
We  have also considered a number of  alternatives to the Summers-Heston 
quality-of-data variable as an indicator of countries’ ability to raise noninfla- 
8. The calculations of the t-statistics follow Bickel and Doksum 1977, 220-21. 
9. All the additional results summarized in this section are available on request from the authors. 354  Marta Campillo and Jeffrey A. Miron 
tion  tax revenue. These include the share of  agriculture  in GDP,  the infant 
mortality rate, and the high school enrollment rate. None of these variables 
enters in a robust manner, but the coefficients on all the remaining variables 
are not particularly sensitive to treatment of this issue. 
We have not pursued one further approach to examining this effect, which 
would consist of estimating the interest elasticity of money demand for each 
country and including that as a regressor.  Such a variable is problematic  for 
our purposes since the estimated elasticity in a particular  country in a given 
time period is likely a function of that country’s inflation rate. This problem is 
small if the estimated elasticities  are approximately  equal to the underlying 
structural parameter, but this condition seems unlikely to hold in practice. The 
elasticities might be relatively free of this bias if they were estimated for sam- 
ple periods that do not overlap with our inflation rate sample period, but we do 
not have the necessary data for the appropriate time periods for a sufficiently 
large sample of countries. 
Our fifth set of  robustness  checks attempts to measure  more directly  the 
gap between the socially optimal rate of outputhnemployment and the non- 
inflation-accelerating  rate  of  outputhnemployment. One natural measure of 
this gap is the average level of unemployment,  assuming the socially optimal 
but unobserved rates of outputhnemployment are not systematically related to 
policies that create divergences between the two rates. Unfortunately,  data on 
unemployment tend to be inconsistent, both over time and across countries, so 
we can construct this variable for a relatively limited set of countries. In this 
set, the variable enters negatively,  contrary to the implications  of  the time- 
consistency models, but the relation is weak. In the high-income countries, the 
estimated relation is positive, although again weak. 
As a second way to measure the degree to which policymakers  other than 
the central bank have given the central bank an incentive to raise output, we 
add the level of government consumption relative to output, with and without 
the square of this variable. Assuming such consumption increases economic 
efficiency up to a point but decreases it thereafter, the expected effect on infla- 
tion is positive according to the time-consistency  models. In both specifica- 
tions, however, we fail to find a significant effect, and the sign of the estimated 
effect is sometimes negative. 
An issue related to our estimated standard errors is that some observations 
might be correlated  cross-sectionally, perhaps through  common involvement 
in a given exchange rate mechanism or perhaps because geographic proximity 
produces common susceptibility to certain kinds of shocks. As a crude attempt 
to address this issue, we reestimated the basic specification including dummy 
variables for geographic regions.I0 This modification has almost no effect on 
the results in the full sample. It does lead to significant changes in the high- 
10. We  included dummies for Africa, Asia, Europe, North and Central America, and South 
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income sample, but these should be discounted since they are based on a re- 
gression with only three degrees of freedom. 
The fact that we employ a different measure of CBI than in the papers by 
Romer and Lane raises the question of whether this decision plays a role in the 
results. We have also estimated the basic specification with the measure used 
by Romer and Lane, which includes information on actual rates of turnover in 
central bank governor. This modification has no substantive effect on the re- 
sults. 
One hypothesis we have not examined above is that supply shocks produce 
inflation differentially across countries. We consider this hypothesis by adding 
oil imports as a share of  output to the basic regression. This variable enters 
positively in all samples, and the relation is strong (t-statistic of  2.8) for the 
high-income sample. The remaining coefficients are not affected to any sub- 
stantial degree by the addition of this variable. Thus, our evidence does suggest 
that supply shocks play a nonnegligible role, especially in the high-income 
countries. 
The final issue we address is Posen’s measure of FOI. This variable exists 
for only a subset of  countries (roughly, those with inflation rates below 30% 
during the 1960-89  period), so we cannot add it to all of  our specifications. 
When we add it to our basic regression estimated on Posen’s low-to-moderate 
inflation sample, however, it enters insignificantly and with a much smaller 
coefficient than in his results. This is probably not because our additional vari- 
ables knock it out. Instead, it appears that FOI is only moderately related to 
inflation even in Posen’s data for the 1970s and 1980s; much of the strength in 
his results derives from the data for the 1960s. 
As a final result, it is useful to consider one further specification. In this 
regression, we drop CBI, since it does not appear to play an important role and 
since it is the variable that limits our sample most significantly. This specifica- 
tion provides results for a sample of sixty-eight countries that is almost identi- 
cal to that for the narrower sample for which CBI exists. Thus, the basic rela- 
tions documented above appear to exist more broadly. 
9.4  Conclusions 
The results presented in this paper must be taken with a certain number of 
grains of  salt. Even in the best case, we do not have an enormous number of 
observations, and in many cases this problem is severe. Many of the proxies 
we  employ are crude, to say the least, and some are potentially endogenous 
with respect to inflation. The earlier papers in this literature are subject to more 
or less the same critiques, but caution is nevertheless in order. 
Subject to these caveats, our results shed new  light on the cross-country 
determinants of inflation. The more modest conclusions concern the two main 
hypotheses examined in earlier papers. These papers suggested that CBI is not 
a substantial causal factor in inflation performance, but our results make this 356  Marta Campillo and Jeffrey A. Miron 
conclusion  inescapable.  Conversely, earlier  papers  made  a  strong case  that 
openness  causes  low  inflation,  and  our results  help eliminate  any  residual 
doubt. 
The more interesting results in the paper concern the new issues addressed. 
We find some evidence that prior inflation experience plays a nonneglible role 
in inflation performance. The most interesting interpretation is that high infla- 
tion produces investments  in inflation-avoiding  technologies, which then  re- 
duce the costs of inflation. The fact that higher income tends to predict higher 
inflation  is consistent  with this  interpretation.  We  recognize,  however, that 
other interpretations are possible. 
We also find consistent evidence that optimal tax considerations do matter 
in determining inflation rates. This is perhaps not surprising, since this result 
is implied by a broad class of models and has been documented in the cases of 
particular countries. But the result has not previously  been demonstrated  to 
hold as widely as found here, and we show both that the overall need for reve- 
nue matters and that inflation is adjusted relative  to other taxes in the right 
direction, given the need for revenue. 
Our overall summary of these results is that institutional arrangements do 
not by themselves seem to be of much help in achieving low inflation. Eco- 
nomic fundamentals,  such as openness,  political  instability,  and tax policy, 
seem to play a much  larger role. This does not mean policymakers  should 
ignore institutions or that institutions play no role; our work might simply have 
little power to demonstrate the importance of institutions or to isolate the criti- 
cal aspects of institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, our results suggest that 
quick fixes-increasing  the tenure of the central bank governor-do  not make 
a big difference unless the underlying conditions for low inflation are present. 
Creating those conditions is undoubtedly difficult, but it also appears to be es- 
sential. 
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Comment  Maurice Obstfeld 
This careful and important paper by Marta Campillo and Jeffrey Miron is the 
latest to caution against a premature causal interpretation of simple correla- 
tions between long-term inflation performance and various measures of central 
bank independence (CBI). In this spirit, Posen (1995) has argued that CBI and 
low inflation are both explicable  by the effectiveness of the financial communi- 
ty’s opposition to inflation. The Campillo-Miron study, which systematically 
assesses an array of potential determinants of inflation for a broad cross-section 
of countries, suggests that Posen’s empirical results are largely germane to the 
1960s. Like Posen, the present authors see little evidence that CBI per se con- 
tributes to low inflation. Here the factors most robustly and unconditionally 
correlated with favorable inflation outcomes appear to be low public debt, eco- 
nomic openness, political stability, and quality of aggregate data. Higher past 
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inflation and higher per capita income appear to aggravate inflation, for reasons 
that remain unclear. 
The authors  acknowledge the difficulty  of  interpreting empirical correla- 
tions in the presence of pervasive endogeneity. To  address the problem they 
carry  out  numerous  sensitivity  checks,  and  in  their  main  results  often  use 
explanatory variables measured at or close to the start of their sample period, 
1973-94.  In some cases this choice probably dooms them to finding insignifi- 
cance. 
For example, it is hard to believe that much information about the preferred 
exchange rate regime is contained in the  1974 observation, drawn from the 
transitional year between the final Bretton  Woods collapse and the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund’s formal decision to live without universally  fixed ex- 
change rates. On the other hand, the authors are right in their reluctance to use 
later data. Most satisfactory would be to include as regressors the potential 
determinants of the exchange rate regime. One of the most important of these, 
openness, is included and does appear to have a strong negative  impact on 
inflation. One way to assess the channels through which openness discourages 
inflation would be to study its effect on exchange-rate-regime choice through 
cross-section regression. 
Use of  initial (1975) public debt-GDP  ratios also appears problematic  at 
first glance, but turns out to be revealing. As figure 9C. 1 shows, many industrial 
countries have experienced sharp increases in debt-GDP ratios since the early 
1970s. (The same statement is true of developing countries.) How much infor- 
mation, then, would one expect to find in data two decades old? Perhaps sur- 
prisingly, the answer is, a lot. Figure 9C.2 shows the striking positive correla- 
tion between fifteen industrial countries’ debt-GDP ratios in 1975 and in 1991. 
Least-squares regression yields 
Debt,, 
,  R2 = 0.61  ___ =  0.21 + 1.19 __ 
GDP,,  GDP,, 
(0.07)  (0.23) 
(with  standard errors  in parentheses).  Interestingly,  the  high-debt  industrial 
countries of the early  1970s also tended to be the high-debt countries of the 
early 1990s. 
Campillo and Miron interpret the significance of their public-debt  variable 
as evidence of  optimal inflation choice, along the lines of Phelps’s extension 
(1973) of  Ramsey taxation to include taxation of money balances. They view 
their openness, political  instability, and data-quality variables  as being more 
directly related to potential dynamic inconsistency in monetary policy, a factor 
fundamental to the normative case for an independent central bank. However, 
public debt itself, if denominated in domestic currency, as it generally is, can 
also be a powerful  source of  additional inflation credibility problems.  I will 
illustrate the reason at some length, as the point has an important bearing on 
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Fig. 9C.2  Debt ratios, fifteen OECD countries 
Consider the following rudimentary model. (See also Calvo 1989.)  The gov- 
ernment inherits a nominal debt Do contracted at a nominal interest rate of  i,, 
which  it  must  pay  off entirely through  taxes 7  on nominal output Py and 
through money creation M -  M,, where Mo is the previous period's nominal 
money stock. After this repayment, the economy comes to an end. The re- 
sulting government budget constraint is 360  Marta Campillo and Jeffrey A. Miron 
(1 + i")D, zz P7y + M -  M,. 
The demand for money in any period is given by the quantity equation M  = 
kPy (notwithstanding  the impending end of  the economy). If  P, denotes the 
previous period's price level and the inflation rate T is defined as a tax rate on 
nominal claims, 
P -  P, 
P' 
m=- 
then the preceding budget constraint can be reformulated as 
Plainly inflation taxes not only real balances ky, but also the real value of the 
scheduled nominal debt repayment (1 + i,JD,. 
Now consider the optimal level of inflation when the government chooses 7 
and T according to a Phelpsian optimal tax rule. The government minimizes 
the loss function 
where a measures  relative inflation aversion,  subject to budget constraint  1. 
Define the inherited  real  debt, do = DJP,.  The first-order condition  for an 
optimal tax package is 
7  4 
Tr  = -[k  + (1 + &-I, 
U  Y 
which, in combination with constraint  1, yields the government's  preferred ex 
post inflation choice: 
(2) 
It is easy to see that inflation is an increasing function of the inherited real debt 
burden, (1 + i,)d,. 
The responsiveness of inflation to past debts allows dynamic inconsistency 
to creep in. If there were no possibility of devaluing the debt ex post through 
surprise inflation-imagine  that all government debt were indexed-then  the 
first-order condition for taxes would be T = rk/a  and, assuming the same past 
real debt do,  optimal inflation would be 
(1 + i,)d,[k?,  + (1 + i")d,,I  ~- 
T==-- 
uy'  + [ky + (1 + i,)do]2 ' 
where r is the (exogenous) real interest rate. But if there is nominal debt, the 
government will set inflation higher than this level in equilibrium (as one can 361  Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries? 
show). How high will equilibrium inflation be? Given rational expectations on 
the part of bondholders, the past nominal interest rate i,  fully reflects antici- 
pated future inflation: 
l+r 
1-IT 
1  + i,  = 
An equilibrium inflation rate (there may be more than one) is found by substi- 
tuting this expression into equation 2 and solving for IT. Equilibrium inflation 
is higher than it would be with indexed debt because, in equilibrium, inflation 
is anticipated and thus fails to reduce the government’s real interest obligation. 
In analogy with the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon accounts of high- 
employment monetary  policy, inflation  expectations  raise  nominal  interest 
rates and the debt burden, prompting an accommodating monetary response 
that ultimately is checked by  a rising marginal cost of inflation. Not only is 
inflation higher than it would be with indexed government debt, so are conven- 
tional distorting taxes, which also rise to bear part of the increased real debt 
burden. Thus, the presence of nominal debt creates a classic dynamic inconsis- 
tency problem that magnifies the conventional optimal-tax effect of govern- 
ment debt on inflation. 
If the Campillo-Miron results on debt levels reflect dynamic inconsistency, 
rather than a more benign optimal balancing of marginal distortions in a setting 
of credible policies, then the normative case for CBI certainly is strengthened. 
Indeed, one potent argument for CBI is that it imposes fiscal discipline by 
closing off the easy options of money financing and debt devaluation. Thus, an 
independent central bank may discourage both government debt issue and the 
ultimate resort to inflationary finance. A world in which CBI affected inflation 
primarily through this fiscal-discipline channel could yield regression results 
much like those the authors report. It would be interesting to know if, cross- 
sectionally, CBI has any impact on fiscal prudence. For industrial countries, 
casual empiricism indicates a negative answer. 
The remarkable positive correlation of  debt ratios over time (figure 9C.2) 
suggests to me instead that political fragmentation and polarization, of the type 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) link to public deficits, may also help explain long- 
run inflation performance. Indeed, this is also the main point of  Cukierman, 
Edwards, and Tabellini (1992). Consistent with this view, Posen’s financial op- 
position to inflation measure ( 1995) includes information on characteristics of 
the political scene. 
The array of unanswered questions does not detract from Campillo and Mir- 
on’s contribution in investigating a broad range of explanations for inflation 
within a unified empirical framework. While they rightly view their interpreta- 
tions as tentative, the patterns they have uncovered provide important starting 
points  for future research. An obvious focus would be the potential  casual 
mechanisms that the authors discuss. Future research should also exploit the 362  Marta Campillo and Jeffrey A. Miron 
dynamic properties of  the data, as in the related study by Grilli and Milesi- 
Ferretti (1995). One puzzle that might be addressed using time-series data is 
the following:  If public debt, through whatever mechanism, is such an im- 
portant determinant of inflation, why have inflation rates in the industrial world 
come down since the early 1980s despite the continuing increase in the average 
public debt-GDP  ratio? And if  greater CBI has contributed to this develop- 
ment, can that contribution endure in the absence of parallel fiscal reform? 
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